The Relative Importance of Asset Allocation and Security Selection
Introduction
The common belief that asset allocation is superior to other investment activities originates from the 1986 article by Brinson, Hood and Beebower (BHB) . The frequently cited conclusion of both this article and its updated version five years later by Brinson, Singer and Beebower (BSB) is that strategic asset allocation accounts for over 90% of the variation in the performance of 91 pension plans over a ten-year period.
1 However, as emphasized by Kritzman and Page (2003) (hereafter, KP), and recently illustrated by Kritzman (2006) , it could be quite hazardous to draw any conclusion on the relative importance of security selection and asset allocation using the methodological approach adopted by BHB/BSB.
2 Kritzman (2006, p.10) 
provides a simple numerical example to demonstrate that "most of the variation that they [BHB/BSB] attributed to asset allocation arose not from the choice of the portfolio's asset mix but, instead, from the [only] decision to invest [in anything]".
The debate on the relative importance of asset allocation and security selection recently took a new turn when KP adopted a normative approach based on a bootstrap simulation to establish the hierarchy of such investment activities. Their approach is designed to disentangle investor behavior from investment opportunity, as it is based on potential, rather than realized portfolio returns. In fact, normative economics -as opposed to positive studies -explore which investment choice has the greatest potential to influence investment results rather than focus on what investors chose to do. KP (2003, p. 22) essentially find that " […] asset allocation is the least important investment activity […] and security selection is the most important investment choice".
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Those results are important and challenge conventional wisdom. KP argue that investors, for a variety of reasons, tend to hug certain benchmarks and avoid engaging meaningfully in security selection. Some critics, notably Staub (2004) , claim that the authors implicitly harness asset allocation. Staub also questions the normative status of KP's work for arbitrarily establishing the asset mix benchmark at 60% stocks, 30% bonds and 10% cash. KP (2004) provided a response to each of Staub's critiques, notably showing that allowing for greater asset allocation bets within their framework does not invalidate the hierarchy previously observed. Our study to a large extent follows KP's normative approach and builds on their bootstrapping methodology.
Our contribution to the debate on the relative importance of asset allocation and security selection in the U.S. market is concentrated along the following four dimensions.
Firstly, we introduce a more representative benchmark portfolio to provide a better understanding of the relative importance of both activities. While KP used 60% stocks, 30%
bonds and 10% cash, we believe that in the current investment environment, practitioners consider a broader spectrum of asset classes comprising traditional as well as non-traditional 
Data and Methodology Data
In their widely discussed paper, KP (2003) generated portfolios with asset mixes varying randomly around 60% stocks, 30% bonds and 10% cash. This asset allocation is legitimate, but we examine another asset allocation benchmark which is more in line with the broader spectrum of asset classes available to institutional investors. This spectrum comprises traditional as well as non-traditional classes, namely, real estate, private equity, and commodities, among others. We examine the relative importance of asset allocation and security selection using a benchmark portfolio which is 75% invested in traditional asset classes and 25% in non-traditional classes. The first two columns of Exhibit 1 show the asset classes chosen to represent our benchmark portfolio and the weight given to each one. 5 The sources of the data used are presented in the third column, and descriptive statistics for each asset class appear from the fourth column.
<Insert Exhibit 1 about here>
For the security selection analysis, we lay particular emphasis on the construction of the database. Rather than picking only stocks listed in the current S&P 500 index, we carefully construct a database free of any survivorship bias. We retain the exact 500 
Asset Allocation Methodology
Except for the notable change in the investment opportunity set for asset allocation, we use a bootstrapping methodology similar to KP (2003) . That means we randomly choose an asset mix at the beginning of each of the twenty annual periods, starting in July 1985, and compute the corresponding return over the next four quarters. We obtain a time-series of 80 quarterly portfolio returns. We then repeat this experiment 10,000 times, with each repetition representing one sample portfolio. In choosing a random asset mix, we proceed as in KP (2003). We make 100 draws with replacement, each draw representing one percent of the portfolio, from a pool of six asset classes, in the following proportions (see Table 1 ): 5% cash, 30% bonds, 40% stocks, 10% real estate, 10% private equity, and 5% commodities. To appraise the portfolios generated by this bootstrapping procedure, we provide in Exhibit 2 the distribution in the sample portfolio weights of two asset classes -stocks and real estate -along with their respective benchmark portfolio weights.
<Insert Exhibit 2 about here>
Exhibit 2 shows that the asset allocation drawing method assigns to stocks a random weight of around 40%, ranging from 18% to 61%. However, in 95% of cases, the stock weight ranges from 30% to 50%, representing a ±10% bet. For real estate, the random weight varies around 10%, between 1% and 22%. In 95% of all cases, real estate weights vary between 4% and 16%, representing a ±6% bet.
While we retain a wider investment opportunity set containing alternative asset classes, Exhibit 2 confirms that the asset allocation method used by KP does not tightly anchor sample portfolios as much as some critics have implied. We believe that asset allocators can extend their bets through these reasonable ranges and, contrary to Staub (2004), we are confident of the normative aspect of such rebalancing rules.
To determine the importance of the asset allocation activity through time, we measure the dispersion in the performance of the 10,000 sample portfolios resulting from the different asset mixes randomly derived from distributions, as illustrated in Exhibit 2. The more dispersed the performance of the sample portfolios, the more asset allocation should be seen as important. KP (2003, p.16 ) underline that dispersion is important to both skilful and unskilful investors; to the former because "it enables them to increase wealth beyond what they could expect to achieve from average performance," and to the latter because "it exposes them to losses that might arise."
Modified Security Selection Methodology
As emphasized by KP (2004) in their response to Staub's (2004) comments, uniform rebalancing rules are essential in order to establish a comparison between two investment choices. Thus, we design a modified security selection methodology that ensures strict uniformity with the asset allocation methodology: with the asset mix established according to Exhibit 1, we generate 10,000 sample portfolios annually, and record their returns over the four subsequent quarters. For each portfolio, we randomly select 100 stocks with replacement, with each constituent of the S&P 500 being assigned a probability equal to its weight in the index (same method as for asset allocation). By contrast, KP use a sequential rule: they randomly select 100 stocks with replacement, with each constituent being assigned an equal probability, and then rescale returns according to their relative market capitalizations. Both methods differ with respect to the probability of selecting a stock and to the weight assigned to each selected stock within the sample portfolios. Consequently, the weight dispersion among large stocks within portfolios is significant, whether it is our methodology or that of KP that is used.
To illustrate the differences between both security selection methodologies, consider a fictitious stock (ABC), with a 10% weight, in a 500 constituents' stock index, and assume that the 499 other stocks in the index are equally weighted ( 499 % 90 each). The probability of randomly picking ABC x times out of n=100 draws with replacement under the binomial distribution is given by:
Both security selection methods differ in terms of the probability, p, of picking ABC at each draw. Under our security selection method, the probability, p, is equal to the actual ABC weight in the index, that is 10%. By contrast, with the KP security selection method, the probability, p, is equal for each stock, that is 500 1 , since the stock index does have 500 constituents. Exhibit 3 provides the probability of picking ABC x times out of 100 draws under both methodologies. As an example, the probability of randomly picking ABC twice Both security selection methods also differ with respect to the way the weight of ABC is calculated in the sample portfolios. Under our security selection method, the weight of ABC is given by the number of occurrences, x, divided by the number of draws, n. With the KP security selection method, the weight of ABC in a random portfolio is a function of the respective index weights of ABC (10%) and of the other randomly selected stocks ( 499 % 90 ).
Exhibit 3 provides the weight of ABC in the sample portfolio, given ABC has been picked x times out of 100 draws under both methodologies. As an illustration, the weight of ABC in the portfolio, given that ABC has been selected twice out of 100 draws, is equal to 2% in our case, while it is 53.1% for KP.
Within our methodology, the weight associated with ABC varies around 10%, from 2% to 20%. For KP, the weight associated with ABC is either 0% for 81.9% of the sample portfolios, or 35.9% or higher, for 18.1% of the sample portfolios (see Exhibit 3). The KP dispersion is much larger than ours, with the standard deviation being 14.7% with their method, and 3% with ours.
<Insert Exhibit 3 about here>
Based on actual S&P 500 data as of June 30, 2005, Exhibit 4 shows the distribution of actual weights assigned to General Electric (GE), the largest S&P 500 constituent, within the two frameworks.
<Insert Exhibit 4 about here>
Our security selection methodology assigns GE, which accounts for 3.31% of the S&P 500 index at the end of June 2005, a random weight ranging from 0% to 12%; by contrast, KP's original method assigns a weight ranging from 0% to 46% to GE, a much wider range. What is troubling in this last observation is that, firstly, a sample portfolio can be heavily loaded with just a single stock possibly weighting as much as 46%, and secondly, 82% of the time, the largest S&P 500 stock is not included in the sample portfolio. In 18% of cases, when it would be included, its weight ranges from 11% to 46%. KP's original method looks like a binary scheme for larger stocks: either zero or a very large weight.
Exhibit 5 reports the probabilities of assessing a zero weight in a sample portfolio to the group of the i largest constituents of the S&P 500 as of June 30, 2005.
<Insert Exhibit 5 about here>
Our results show that sample portfolios could be zero-weighted for each of the three largest companies (General Electric, Exxon Mobil, and Microsoft, representing 9% of the index) nearly 55% of the time, based on the KP security selection approach. Furthermore, 13.3% of the time, a sample portfolio could possibly include none of the ten largest companies in the index, which are firms that represent more than 21% of the index. By comparison, with our methodology, which ensures that the security selection method is exactly similar to the asset allocation method, the probability of not including any of the ten largest stocks in a sample portfolio is negligible.
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Results

Asset Allocation
Exhibit 6 shows the results of the asset allocation bootstrap analysis. Every quarter, we present the cross-sectional dispersion in the quarterly performance of randomly selected portfolios relative to the benchmark portfolio arising from different asset mixes. We report the 
Security Selection
We report the cross-sectional dispersion in quarterly performance of randomly drawn portfolios in Exhibit 7. Unlike in Exhibit 6, the dispersion in this case arises from different security portfolios with the same asset mix rather than from different asset mixes with the same security portfolio. We highlight the quarter during which security selection generated the highest amount of cross-sectional dispersion.
<Insert Exhibit 7 about here>
The 1985-1998 period shows a relatively small and quite stable dispersion in sample portfolios performance. During this period, the average difference between the fifth best sample portfolio out of one hundred and the fifth worst is about 1.5% per quarter. Neither the October 1987 stock market crash, the first Iraqi crisis of 1990 nor the Russian default in August 1998 seemed to have affected the way security selection impacts the overall performance of portfolios. However, the high tech bubble (the 1999-2002 period) clearly produces a larger dispersion in portfolio performance, indicating a larger opportunity for security selection activity. The quarter with the largest dispersion indeed corresponds to the peak of the bubble (the last three months of 2000). 8 The difference between the 5 th and the 95 th percentiles during this quarter is 3.58%. On an annualized basis, over the entire twentyyear period of our study, the difference between the 5 th and the 95 th percentile sample portfolios for security selection is 0.8%, which is 68% lower than the average of about 2.5%
obtained by KP over the 1987 KP over the -2001 Like KP, we do not allow security selection in any asset class except stocks. It may be the case that security selection is more important than reported -both herein and in KPowing to the cross-sectional dispersion of performance within other asset classes, especially to the wider dispersion within alternative asset classes such as real estate or private equity.
The dispersion of relative returns associated with security selection in each of the six asset classes and their correlation structure are important elements to make a point. Except for stocks, we can not precisely estimate the cross-sectional dispersion of each of the five other asset classes considered, due to limited data availability on their respective opportunity sets. 10 However, given that the drivers of relative returns in each of the six asset classes are conceptually independent of each other -leading to low correlations between alpha activities (Waring and Siegel [2003] ) -we believe that the dispersion when allowing security selection within the six asset classes should not be dramatically higher than the one generated through stocks only.
The next section summarizes and compares the findings for both asset allocation and security selection activities, using our modified security selection methodology and benchmark portfolio, and then controlling for KP's benchmark portfolio.
Asset Allocation Versus Security Selection
Exhibit 8 illustrates the dispersions generated by both activities in a single graph. We portray the dispersion of the quarterly difference between the 5 th and 95 th cross-sectional percentile performances generated by the bootstrap simulated portfolios as induced by both asset allocation and security selection activities. The greater the difference, the greater the relative importance of a given activity.
<Insert Exhibit 8 about here>
Exhibit 8 reveals three main features: (1) the relative importance of asset allocation and security selection is time-dependent; (2) the asset allocation-driven dispersion is more volatile than the security selection-induced dispersion, and is especially sensitive to crises;
and (3) the security selection activity generates as much dispersion in active return as asset allocation so that it cannot be unequivocally declared that one activity is structurally more or less important than the other. While the first two features are practically indisputable, the third needs some clarification.
It is important to emphasize that our results do not necessarily contradict those reported by KP -with KP, the security selection activity dominates the asset allocation activity. The difference is essentially attributable to two factors: 11 (1) the difference in security selection methodologies, and (2) the difference in benchmark portfolios -the KP benchmark portfolio comprises only traditional asset classes, while ours also comprises nontraditional ones, and consequently, a smaller fraction of stocks as well. The latter explains about a third of the difference in results, while the former explains the other two-thirds. In other words, if we were to repeat the simulations with our security selection methodology, but using KP's benchmark portfolio (60/30/10 stocks, bonds and cash), the difference in annualized performance between the 5 th th and the 95 percentile sample portfolios induced by security selection activity would be 1.3%, a figure which is higher than our reported average of 0.8%, but significantly lower than KP's average of 2.5%. 12 Consequently, the relative importance of security selection over asset allocation (1.3% -0.8% = 0.5%) is reduced by two-thirds when compared to the original findings of KP (2.5% -0.8% = 1.7%). By deduction, the benchmark portfolio difference is thus responsible for the other third of the difference in results.
Conclusion
We re-examine the relative importance of asset allocation and security selection decisions. We use the normative approach introduced by Kritzman and Page (2003) implicitly "harnessing" this activity, we focus on the security selection side. We design a modified security selection methodology which ensures strict uniformity with asset allocation rebalancing rules. Thirdly, we use an unbiased investment universe for the stock component of the portfolio, and, finally, we consider an up-to-date 20 year period ending in June 2005.
We demonstrate that KP's security selection methodology does not yield strict uniformity with the asset allocation rebalancing rules and implicitly produces very large active bets, either by completely ignoring as many as ten of the largest stocks in the SP&500
universe -with more than 20% of market capitalization -or by sometimes investing as much as 46% of a portfolio in a single stock. By contrast, our modified security selection methodology, which is in line with asset allocation rebalancing rules, generates significantly less dispersion in active returns. Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) underscore the importance of assessing the right analysis to the right question, and warn against misinterpretation of BHB/BSB's results.
2 See also the response of Brinson (2006) and Hood (2006) .
3 KP also examine the relative importance of country and industry choices, as well as security selection and sector selection using a broad universe: MSCI World. They also analyze the issue for five specific countries: Australia, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. The hierarchy of investment choice always remains the same, with the most important activity being security selection, and the least important being the asset allocation decision.
